Software Reliability Models: A Survey and an Analysis by Wan, Qiaolan
SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODELS:












Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University











Software reliability is becoming increasingly more important in software engineering.
Software reliability models have been developed to predict or estimate the reliability of
software during its development. There are more than 40 software reliability models in
the open literature, but no one model is best for every case under all circumstances. In
this thesis, six software reliability models: Musa's models, the Jelinski-Moranda model,
the Geol-Okumoto NHPP model, Shooman's model, the Littlewood-Verral model, and
the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model were investigated. Then the BBN model was
analyzed in detail through applying it to predict the reliability of SeqWizard, a software
system developed to process large-scale DNA and protein data.
For the six software reliability models investigated, the following issues were
discussed for each model: a brief history, model classification, software development
phase(s) applied, basic assumptions, data requirements, model form, and application
scope. The six models were also compared from three aspects: factors modeled,
availability of CASE tools, and advantages and disadvantages. These survey results can
be used by practitioners to help make a decision when choosing among software
reliability model(s).
A BBN for the reliability of SeqWizard was constructed through seven steps. The
suitability of this BBN was checked by a set of hypothetical scenarios. The predicted
reliability of SeqWizard was consistent with the reliability report of SeqWizard generated
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by Arizona University, Purdue University, and Oklahoma State University in its beta
testing stage. This indicated the suitability of the reliability BBN constructed in this thesis
and the effectiveness of the BBN model for reliability prediction. In addition to
reliability, the number of faults introduced to SeqWizard, the number of faults found
during testing, and the number of latent faults remained in SeqWizard were also obtained
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Modern society IS heavily dependent on automated systems to control crucial
functions such as transportation, communication, utilities, and health care [Hansen et a1.
99]. Software errors have caused dramatic and costly problems in recent years. Such
problems include: the Year 2000 problem, the power outage at the AT&T switching
facility in New York City [Pham 95], and the cost of lives (such as overdosed cancer
patients from radiation therapy machines in 1986 and the death of 28 U. S. soldiers in the
1991 Gulf War [Schach 97]).
The need for reliable software increases with the increase in size and complexity of
computer systems. How to get reliable software is one of the biggest questions for
software engineers [Lyu 96]. There are several approaches to address this challenge. One
of them is to select a proper software reliability model to predict or estimate the
reliability of software during its development. A software reliability model specifies the
general fonn of dependency of the failure process on the principal factors that affect it
[Lyu 96]. The objectives of a software reliability model are to evaluate software
quantitatively; to provide development status, test status, and schedule status; and to
monitor the reliability perfomlance in software reliability engineering [Neufelder 93].
-
A good software reliability model should have several important characteristics
[Musa et a1. 90]: it should give good predictions of future failure behavior and compute
useful quantities, it should be simple and widely applicable, and it should be based on
sound assumptions.
More than 40 software reliability models can be found in the open literature. But no
one model is best for every case under all circumstances. Because it is difficult to model
the interaction of the following three factors [Lyu 96]:
1) Human Factors: During either software development or software operation, humans
are involved. There are different combinations of all aspects of human beings: novice or
expert, hate-mode or love-mode, absent-minded or single-minded, etc. [Samadzadeh and
Edwards 88] [Sommerville 97].
2) Diversity of Software Elements: Reusing existing software plays a key role in software
engineering productivity, especially in the past two decades. Software reuse can be
fulfilled at different levels such as object-code level, subroutine library level (executable
code level), source code level, or component and package level [Zand and Samadzadeh
94]. Software reuse may introduce complexity into software system if great care is not
taken. The "black box" nature of reusable software may make it hard to evaluate the
reliability of the whole software system precisely.
3) Uncertain nature of software failure patterns: Software failure is known after it
happens. People know that it may happen some time but do not know exactly when and
how it will happen until it happens. It is hard to model the failure pattern because of this
future knowledge requirement [Fenton and Neil 99].
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As a result, practitioners are left with the following questions at the decision making
step. Should we spend extra effort to apply a software reliability model to estimate the
reliability of our software system? Which software reliability model(s) should we apply
to our software system? When should we apply a software reliability model to our
software system? Is there a proper automated CASE tool available for the software
reliability model we need?
Typically. software reliability models are either compared based on mathematical
analysis [Lyu 96] [Neufelder 93J or evaluated based on the availability of test data
[Fenton and Neil 99] [Pharo 95]. However, this thesis research took a different approach.
This research provided a detailed survey of some current and popular software reliability
models. Also. the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model was analyzed through
applying it to predict the reliability of SeqWizard, a software system developed by the
author in the OSU Bioinforrnatics Lab to process large scale DNA and protein data.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. An overview of some software
reliability models is given in Chapter II. A survey of six current and popular software
reliability models is provided in Chapter III. The analysis of the Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBN) model is given in Chapter IV. A summary and suggested future work
are given in Chapter V.
3
CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODELS
More than 40 software reliability models can be found in the open literature. These
models can be classified differently based on various criteria. In this thesis, software
reliability models were classified into three families: 1) traditional models, 2)
combination models, and 3) Bayesian models, based on the type of factors and the
magnitude of each factor regarding defect prediction. The descriptions of three model
families are given in the following three subsections. Traditional models are described in
Section 2.1, combination models in Section 2.2, and Bayesian models in Section 2.3.
2.1 Traditional Model.s
The traditional software reliability models look at the impact of each fault as being of
same magnitude regarding software reliahility. Software reliability is changed when a
fault is discovered and fixed. The main advantage of the models in this category is their
simplicity. They can be easily applied if the behavior of software meets the basic
assumptions. Some models have been implemented as part of CASE tools for automated
applications [Lyu 96]. This family includes the following reliability models.
4
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• Execution Time Model. This model uses actual execution time of software in the
modeling process. Time between failures is expressed in terms of CPU time rather than
elapsed calendar time. Execution time is considered more reflective of actual stress
induced on software [Musa et al. 87]. Examples include Musa's Basic model and Musa's
Logarithmic model [Musa et al. 90].
• Failure Rate Model. This model uses per-fault failure rate or mean time to failure
(MTTF) in the modeling process. This model form assumes an exponential failure
intensity function for software errors. Examples include the Jelinski-Moranda model and
the Schick-Wolverton model [Dhillon 87].
• Reliability Growth Model. This model measures and predicts the improvement of
reliability through debugging process. A growth function is used to represent this
progress. The independent variables of the growth function can be time, number of test
cases, or testing stages. The dependent variables can be reliability, failure rate, or
cumulative number of errors detected [Pham 95]. Example models include the Duane
growth model, the Weibull growth model [Dhillon 87], and the nonhomogeneous Poisson
process (NHPP) models such as the Geol-Okumoto model and the (delayed) S-shape
growth model [Liang and Trivedi 99].
• Markov Model. This model models the number of remaining faults as a stochastic
counting process. When a continuous-time discrete-state Markov chain is adapted, the
state of the process is the number of remaining faults, and the time between fai lures is the
sojourning time from one state to another. If we assume that the failure rate of a program
is proportional to the number of remaining faults, the linear death process and the linear
birth-and-death process are two models readily available. The former assumes that the
5
remaining errors are monotonically nonincreasing, whereas the latter allows faults to be
introduced during debugging. Examples include linear death with perfect debugging
(Shooman's model), linear death with imperfect debugging, and nonstationary linear
death with perfect debugging [Lyu 96] .
• Program Structure Model. This model views a program as a reliability network. A node
represents a module or a subroutine, and the directed arc represents the program
execution sequence among modules. By estimating the reliability of each node and
assuming that the failure at each node is independent, we can approach the reliability of a
program as a reliability network problem. Examples include the Littlewood Markov
structure model and Cheung's user-oriented Markov model [Dhillon 87] .
• Input Space Model. This model enumerates all sets of inputs for a computer program
and detennines the probability distribution of input states or the operatio1lal profile.
Reliability is defined as the number of successful runs over the total number of runs.
Examples include the Nelson model and the Shooman decomposition model [Dhillon 87].
Generally, input space models have little practical use because of their theoretical
inclination [Dhillon 87].
2.2 Combination Models
The combination software reliability models are constructed from different
combination of traditional models. The traditional models here are called component
models of the combination model. Combination models look at the impact of each defect
as being of different magnitude regarding software reliability. The difference is
6
detennined by the definition of the combination of different traditional models. The main
advantage of the models in this family is their wider application range than that of the
component models (traditional models). This family includes the Equally-Weighted
Linear Combination Model (ELC), the Median-Oriented Linear Combination Model
(MLC), the Unequally-Weighted Linear Combination Model (ULC), and the
Dynamically-Weighted Linear Combination Model (DLC). These models were
developed and tested by Michael Lyu and Allen Nikora with promising results [Lyu and
Nikora 92].
The component models (the basic building blocks) are the Goel-Okumoto Model
(GO), the Musa-Okumoto Model (MO), and the Littlewood-Verrall Model (LV). The
selection of these component models is based on the facts that: 1) GO, MO, and LV are
widely used and judged to perform well; 2) GO, MO, and LV represent different
categories of models; and most importantly, 3) the predictive biases of GO, MO, and LV
tend to be canceled when combined (GO tends to be optimistic, LV tends to be
pessimistic, and MO might go either way) [Lyu and Nikora 92]. The descriptions of ELC,
MLC, ULC, and DLC follow .
• Equally-Weighted Linear Combination Model (ELC). This model is formed by
assuming that the three component models GO, MO, and LV have a constant equal
weight. The arithmetic average of three component models' predictions is taken as the
ELC model prediction. That is, p(ELC) = 1/3 p(GO) + 1/3 p(MO) + 1/3 p(LV). There are
two major purposes for developing this model. One is to reduce the risk of relying on an
individual model (traditional model) that may generate grossly inaccurate prediction. The
7
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other is to retain the simplicity of using the individual traditional models [Lyu and Nikora
92].
• Median-Oriented Linear Combination Model (MLC). In this model, the median of the
predictions of all component models is the prediction of the MLC model. That is,
p(MLC) = median(p(GO), p(MO), p(LV». The justification for this model is that the
choice of the median might be more moderate than the mean in some cases. It can better
tolerate an erroneous prediction that is far away from the others [Lyu and Nikora 92].
• Unequally-Weighted Linear Combination Model (ULC). This model follows the idea of
MLC. The prediction of ULC mainly relies on the component model that gives median
performance. Unlike MLC, which ignores the results of the other two component models,
ULC takes into account the prediction of the model that gives an optimistic result and the
one that gives a pessimistic result. But the optimistic and pessimistic predictions will
make small contributions to the final prediction. For example, p(ULC) = 1/100 + 8/10 M
+ 1II 0 P, where 0 represents an optimistic prediction, P denotes a pessimistic prediction,
and M is the median prediction [Lyu and Nikora 92].
• Dynamically-Weighted Linear Combination Model (DLC). In this model, it is assumed
that the applicability of any individual model may change during testing process. The
weights of the component models will therefore change [Lyu and Nikora 92].
2.3 Bayesian Models
The Bayesian models take the viewpoint that software reliability should increase lfno
failure occurs while software is observed. This indicates the growing confidence in
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software by user. Reliability is the reflection of both the number of faults that have been
detected and the amount of failure-free operation. Bayesian models reflect the belief that
different faults have different impacts on software reliability. For instance, given a
software system, when most, if not all, of the faults are clustered in a rarely executed
component, we can still consider that the reliability of this software system is potentially
high. The main advantage of the models in this family is their wide application scope.
The Bayesian's family includes the following reliability models.
• Bayesian General Model: This model takes the viewpoint that it is more important to
look at the behavior of software than to estimate the number of faults in it. It assumes that
failure rate is a random process with regard to failures occurred. It also assumes a prior
distribution of failure rate. This prior distribution reflects the viewpoint that one should
incorporate past information in estimating reliability statistics for the present and for the
future. Examples of this model type include the Littlewood-Verrall model, Kypatisi' s
Bayesian nonhomogeneous Poisson process model, and Liu's Bayesian geometric model
[Lyu 96].
• Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) Model: A BBN is used to model uncertainty in a
problem domain in which both the quantitative and qualitative techniques are employed.
It is also known as Belief Networks, Causal Probability Networks, Causal Nets,
Graphical Probability Networks, Probability Cause-Effect Models, and Probabilistic
Influence Diagrams. The basic idea of a BBN is that a problem is modeled as a set of
nodes i.nterconnected by a set of directed arcs to form a network. Each node in the
network represents a particular occurrence or condition, called a variable. The arcs
indicate the causal effect of the variables on each other. Each node contains a set of states
9
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of the random variable it represents and a conditional probability table (cpt). The cpt of a
node contains probabilities of the node being in a specific state, given the states of its
parents. The probabilities in the CPT indicate the strength of link between nodes. These
probabilities are used to calculate the probability distribution of all nodes in a BBN when
new evidence is entered. Actually a BBN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). This
structure prevents circular logic because the arcs represent causal relationships between
nodes. In practice, this stmcture prevents the algorithm from getting into an infinite loop
or deadlock. When a BBN is established, all the arcs are seeded with the initial estimation
of probabilities. When new evidence is provided, the network automatically updates the
probabilities of all arcs. Recalculation of all the probabilities continues to propagate
across the network, fine-tuning the accuracy of all probabilities. This ability to revise the
probability of an event, based on the new evidence and the old status, is the main




A SURVEY OF SOME SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODELS
The purpose of this survey is to provide infonnation for practitioners to choose proper
software reliability models. Six currcnt and popular software reliability models are
investigated in Section 3.1. Comparisons of six models are given in Section 3.2.
3.1 Investigation of Six Software Reliability Models
In this section, six current and popular software reliability models were investigated.
These models included Musa's models, the Jelinski-Moranda model, the Geol-Okumoto
NHPP model, Shooman's model (these four models belong to the traditional model
family), the Littlewood-Verral model, and the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model
(these two models belong to the Bayesian model family). Since combination models were
still under development, no model was selected from this model family for detailed
investigation.
The selection of the above models was based on their applicability and thcir
representative effects. Musa's models "have had the widest distribution among the
software reliability models" [Lyu 96]. The Jelinski-Moranda model "has the most articles
I1
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written on it in the literatures on software reliability because of its sound theoretical
foundation" [Lyu 96]. The Geol-Okumoto NHPP model "has strong influence on
software reliability modeling" [Liang and Trivedi 99]. It is one of the practical models
that model real situations thoroughly and provide meaningful results [Lyu 96].
Shooman's model represents the Markov model type, which is considered as "a general
way to model software failure process" [Pham 95]. The Littlewood-Verral model is the
software reliability model recommended by the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) as recommended practice standard (AIAA 93) [Lyu 96]. The
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model has attracted much recent attention in diagnostic
and predictive analysis and it has been considered a powerful tool for reasoning under
uncertainty [Fenton and Neil 99].
For each selected software reliability model, the following issues were discussed: 1) a
brief history, 2) model classification, 3) software development phase(s) applied, 4) basic
assumptions, 5) data requirements, 6) model fonn, and 7) application scope. Also, some
comments on the successes/failures of each model were included. The rest of this section
was organized according to these issues.
Following two formulas were used in each model.
Fonnula 1: R(t) = exp [- flo /-'(z) dz]
Formula 2: MTTF = Jooo R(t) dt
where R(t) is software reliability at time t, A(t) isfailure intensity function or hazard rate,
and MTTF is mean time to failure. For each model described below, the failure intensity
function, A(t), was given. The R(t) and MTTF for each model can be obtained by





Musa's models were created and developed by John Musa of AT&T Bell
Laboratories with his colleagues in 1970's. There are two types of Musa's model. One is
Musa's Basic model and the other is Musa's Logarithmic model [Musa et al. 90].
3.1.1.2 Model Classification
Both Musa's Basic and Logarithmic models are execution time models In the
traditional model family.
3.1. 1.3 Software Development Phase(s) Applied
Musa's models can be applied in unit test phase in the software life cycle.
3.1.1.4 Basic Assumptions
Musa's models model software reliability under the following basic assumptions.
(1) Cumulative number of failures by time t follows a Poisson process.
(2) There are a finite number of total errors estimated in software. This number is not
necessarily fixed.
(3) Errors are rectified before software test continues.
(4) Hazard rate for a single fault is constant.
(5) Failure rate is proportional to residual software errors.
3.1.1.5 Data Requirements




The failure intensity function, A(t), for Musa's Basic model is given as follows.
A(t) = Ao exp ( - Po x t )
where t is execution time, Ao is initial failure intensity at the start of execution, Po = A.oJvo.
and Vo is total number of failures that would occur in infinite time.
The failure intensity function, A(t), for Musa' s Logarithmic model is given as follows.
A(t) = An / (leI) 0 t + 1)
where t is execution time, Ao is initial failure intensity at the start of execution, and e is
failure intensity decay parameter.
3.1.1.7 Application Scope
Musa suggested that the choice of the two models in any given application depends
on several factors as summarized in Table I.
Table I. Factors for the Choice Between Musa's Basic
and Logarithmic Models [Musa et a!. 90]
Purpose of application Basic Model Logarithmic Model
Studi.es or predictions before execution X
Studying effects of software engineering
technology (through study of faults) X
Program size changing continually and
substantially X
Highly nonuniform operational profile X




Musa's models have been applied in many diverse fields. They have several
advantages: their predicting results are generally satisfactory, they are simple and easy to
understand, they are thoroughly developed, their parameters have a clear physical
interpretation, and they can handle dynamic systems [Musa et al. 90].
3.1.2 The Jelinski-Moranda Model
3.1.2.1 Brief History
The Jelinski-Moranda model was created and developed by Paul L. Jelinski and Z.
Moranda in 1972 [Dhillon 87].
3.1.2.2 Model Classification
The Jelinski-Moranda model is a failure rate model in the traditional model family.
:U .2.3 Software Development Phase(s) Applied
The Jelinski-Moranda model can be applied in test phase in the software life cycle.
3.1 .2.4 Basic Assumptions
The Jelinski-Moranda model models software reliability under the following basic
assumptions.
(1) There are a constant number of lines of code.
(2) The operational profile of software is consistent.
(3) Every fault has the same chance to be encountered during software operation.
(4) Fault detection rate remains constant over intervals between fault occurrences.
(5) Fault detection rate is proportional to current fault content of software.
15
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(6) Each detected error is corrected without delay.
(7) Failures are independent.
3.1.2.5 Data Requirements
Data required for using the Jelinski-Moranda model are elapsed time between failures
or the actual times that software fails.
3.1.2.6 Model Form
The failure intensity function, A(t), is given by the following formula.
where C is a constant of proportionality, E j is number of initial software errors, and tj is
time between detection of the jth and (j - l)th software errors. With the aid of maximum
likelihood estimation method, the values of parameters E j and C can be estimated as
follows.
k k k
IlI(E j -(j-l))=kItj II (Ej-(j-l»tj
j=l j=l j=l
k
C = k / I ( Ej - U-1 » tj
j=1
where k is number of intervals to detect software errors and t I, t2, ... , tj are sampling
intervals of time between successive software errors [Dhillon 87].
3.1.2.7 Application Scope
Nowadays the Jelinski-Moranda model is not being used directly. But variants
developed from it are widely used [Dhillon 87].
3.1.2.8 Comments
The Jelinski-Moranda model is one of the earliest models developed. The importance
of this model is mainly in setting a framework in this modeling area [Lyu 96].
16
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3.1.3 The Geol-Okumoto NHPP Model
3.1.3.1 Brief History
The Geo1-0kumoto NHPP model was proposed and developed by Amrit Goel and
Kazu Okumoto in 1979 [Liang and Trivedi 99]. The (delayed) S-shaped NHPP IS a
variant of this model developed by Yamada in 1982 [Lyu 96].
3.1.3.2 Model Classification
The Geol-Okumoto NHPP model is a reliability growth model in the traditional
model family.
3.1.3.3 Software Development Phase(s) Applied
The Geol-Okumoto NHPP model can be applied in pre-release phases in the software
life cycle.
3.1.3.4 Basic Assumptions
The Geol-Okumoto NHPP model models software reliability under the following
basic assumptions.
(1) Cumulative number of failures by time t follows a Poisson process.
(2) Number of faults detected in each time interval is independent for any finite
collection of time intervals.
(3) Defects are repaired immediately when they are discovered.
(4) Defect repair is perfect. That is, no new defect is introduced during test.
(5) No new code is added to software during test.
(6) Each unit of execution time during test is equally likely to find a defect if the





The Geol-Okumoto NHPP model requires number of faults counted in each test time
interval and the completion time of each period the software is under observation.
3.1.3.6 Model Form
The mean value function Il(t) is given by following formula.
where t is failure occurrence time, a is expected total number of faults to be eventually
detected, and b is a positive constant.
The failure intensity function, A(t), which is the derivative of Il(t), is obtained as
follows.
A(t) = a b e'bt
where a is expected total number of faults to be eventually detected, b is a positive
constant, and t is failure occurrence time.
3.1.3.7 Application Scope
The Gcol-Okumoto NHPP model can be used to determine an optimal release time
for software.
3.1.3.8 Comments
Goel and Okumoto also adapted this model to use time of fault occurrences instead of
fault counts. Optimal release time was determined based on the cost of finding and fixing
a fault in the testing environment versus the operational environment. The (delayed) S-





Shooman's model was created and developed by Martin Shooman of the New York
Polytechnic Institute in 1972 [Neufelder 93].
3.1.4.2 Model Classification
Shooman's model is a Markov model in the traditional model family.
3.1 .4.3 Software Development Phase(s) Applied
Shooman's model can be used in system integration test phase in the software life
cycle.
3.1.4.4 Basic Assumptions
Shooman's model models software reliability under the following basic assumptions.
(1) Total number of machine instructions remains constant.
(2) Total number of software errors decreases directly as errors are rectified.
(3) No new errors are introduced during the debugging process.
(4) Residual errors are given by subtracting cumulative errors rectified from total
number of errors initially presented.
(5) Hazard function is proportional to remaining number of errors.
3.1.4.5 Data Requirements
Data required for using Shooman's model are total number of machine instructions in
software, execution time of software in a given time period, and total number of errors




The failure intensity function, t...(t), is defined by the following formula.
where t is execution time, a. is a proportionality constant, y is debugging time since the
beginning of system integration, and Et(y) is total number of errors remaining in software
at time y. Et(y) is given as follows.
where Eli is total number of initial errors at time y = 0, which can be approximated using
MTTF, 1m, and Ecu(Y). 1m is total number of machine language instructions in software.
Ecu(Y) is cumulative number of software errors in the time interval [O,y]. ex is given by
following formula.
a. = 8 I (t Et(y))
where 8 is total number of errors during debugging period of [O,y], t is execution time of
software corresponding to debugging period of[O,y], and El(y) is given above.
3.1.4.7 Application Scope
Shooman's model can be used for any software development as long as the process
meets the Markov chai n.
3.1.4.8 Comments
It has been shown that Shooman's model is more effective if used later in the
software life cycle. The main reason for this is that earlier in development, particularly
during debugging and unit test, error rate will probably be increasing over time, in which




3.1.5 The Littlewood-Verrall Model
3.1.5.1 Brief History
The Littlewood-Verrall model was created and developed by B. Littlewood and J. L.
Verrall in the 1970's [Lyu 96].
3.1.5.2 Model Classification
The Littlewood-Verrall model is a Bayesian general model in the Bayesian model
family.
3.1.5.3 Software Development Phase(s) Applied
The Littlewood-Verrall model can be applied m test and release phases III the
software life cycle.
3.1.5.4 Basic Assumptions
The Littlewood-Verrall model models software reliability under the following basic
assumptions.
(1) Successive execution times between failures are independent with parameter ~
that is related to historical data.
(2) Function \jI{i) is an increasing function of programmers' quality and task's
difficulty. A good programmer would have a more rapidly increasing function
than a poor one.
(3) Software is operated in the same manner as expected. That is, software is not
frequently used under extreme situations.
3.1.5.5 Data Requirements





The model form of the Littlewood-Verrall model varies based on the definition of S, a
parameter relating to historical data. and \V(i), a function indicating programmers' quality
and system's complexity. There are two basic fonns: linear fonn and quadratic form.
In the linear fonn, the failure intensity function, A(t), is given as follows.
A(t) = (a - I) / (~02 + 2 Pl t (a _ 1))1/2
where t is failure occurrence time, a, Po. and PI are positive constants related to sand
In the quadratic form, the failure intensity function, ACt), is given as follows.
where t is failure occurrence time, VI = (a - 1)113 I (18 PI)1/3 and V2 = 4 Po3 / (9 (a _ 1)2 PI).
Here a, ~o. and ~1 are positive constants related to Sand tV(i).
3.1.5.7 Application Scope
The Littlewood-Verrall model is now widely applied in software reliability estimation
and prediction. Successful applications of this model alone, or combinations of this
model with other models, show that thc Littlewood-Vcrrall model is effective to estimate
the reliability of software after its completion and before its release [Fenton and Neil 99].
3.1.5.8 Comments
The main characteristic 0 f the Li ttlewood-Verrall model series is that fault correction
process allows the probability that software could be less reliable than before. That is, the
new version of software may be either better or worse than its predecessor. Due to this
uncertainty. the model fonn of the Littlewood-Verrall model becomes very complicated
but flexible [Lyu 96].
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3.1.6 The Bayesian BehefNetworks (BBN) Model
3.1.6.1 Brief History
Bayes' theorem, the underlying theory of BBN, was developed by Thomas Bayes in
the 18th century [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 88]. It was seldom used in computer science
before the 1980's. The success of applying recent algorithms and software tools made it
possible to build and execute realistic models. Bayesian Behef Networks (BBN) model
has attracted much recent attention as a possible solution to the problems of decision
support under uncertainty [Cowell et al. 99] [Fenton and Neil 99].
3.1.6.2 Model Classification
The Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model is in the Bayesian model family.
3.1.6.3 Software Development Phase(s) Applied
The BBN model can be applied in all phases In the software life cycle. Defect
prediction can be explained in two stages [Fenton and Neil 99]. The first stage covers the
phases of requirement analysis, specification development, design, and implementation.
The second stage covers the phases of test and pre-release.
3.1.6.4 Basic Assumptions
The Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model models software reliability under the
following assumptions.
(1) Software defects are not directly caused by program complexity alone.
(2) Causal factors for the presence of defects in software include: a) difficulty of
problem; b) complexity of designed solution; c) programmer/analyst skills; and d)




All data in the software life cycle can be useful for this model.
3.1.6.6 Model Form
A BBN is defined as a triple (N, E, P), where N is a set of nodes, E ~ N x N a set of
edges, and P a set of probabilities [Cowell et a1. 99]. Each node in N is labeled by a
random variable Vi, where 1 ~ j ~ IN I.Each node Vj has a set of states associated with it.
The states of a node can be Boolean values, discrete labels, discrete numbers, intervals, or
continuous values. Each directed edge ei = < Si, ti > E E indicates causal influence from
source node Sj (parent node) to target node tj (child node). For each node ti, the strengths
of causal influences from its parent Sj are quantified by a conditional probability
distribution p(tj ISi), specified in an m x n matrix where m is the number of states of ti,
and n is the number of states of Sj. This m x n matrix is called the conditional probability
table (CPT) of node fi. Each Pi E P is the conditional probability of a node being in a
specific state given the states of its parents. If a node has no parents, its probability is
unconditional. Its CPT is actually a uniform probability distribution if not specified
otherwise. For each node in a BBN, the sum of probabilities of all states should be 1. This
indicates that the BBN model is subject to the standard axiom of probability theory.
3.1.6.7 Application Scope
A BBN is generally applied to problems when there is uncertainty in the data or in the
knowledge about the domain. It has been applied to problems that require diagnosis of
problems from a variety of input data. BBN is generally used in: medical diagnostic
systems such as MUNIN (a medical reasoning system); analysis in the natural, biological,






diagnosis; complex machinery monitoring system such as jet engines, electronic power
generator, and copy machines; trouble-shooting mechanisms such as the help wizard in
Microsoft Office [Hansen et al. 99]. BBN is also used in expert systems [Cowell et al.
99]. In software engineering, BBNs have been applied to estimate uncertainties in
software testing and maintenance [Ziv and Richardson 97], to analyze the dependability
of safety-critical software systems [Bouissou et al. 99], to predict software quality [Neil
and Fenton 96], and to support decision-making during software development [Fenton
and Neil 99]. BBN seems to have potential to combine different approaches of defect
prediction into a single model.
3.1.6.8 Comments
A BBN represents a complete probabilistic model of the system. This is due to the
fact that the joint probability distribution of any elementary system can be derived using
the local conditional probability distributions and network topology [Cowell et al. 99].
Figure 1 is an example of the joint of subsystems. In Figure 1, system 1 and system 2 are
joined together through the common node "#faults". After the joint, the probability of
each node in Figure I (c) will be updated accordingly. The updating will be propagated
over the network to ensure the accuracy of the probability of each node in the whole
network [Cowell et al. 99]. This property suggests the use of BBN models for evaluating












Figure 1. The Joint of Subsystems: (a) system 1, (b) system 2,
and (c) thejoint of system I and system 2
The advantages of using BBN are summarized below.
(1) Specifying complex relationships using conditional probability statements.
(2) Using 'what-if?' analysis and forecasting the effects of process changes.
(3) Easy understanding of seemingly contradictory reasoning via graphical fonnat.
(4) Explicit modeling 'ignorance' and uncertainty in estimates.
(5) Using subjectively or objectively derived probability distributions.
(6) Forecasting with missing data.
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3.2 Comparisons of Six Software Reliability Models
In this section, Musa's models, the Jelinski-Moranda model, the Geol-Okumoto
NHPP model, Shooman's model, the Littlewood-Verral model, and the Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBN) model are compared from three aspects. The comparison from the
aspect of factors modeled is given in Section 3.2.1, the comparison from the aspect of
availability of CASE tools is given in Section 3.2.2, and the comparison from the aspect
of advantages and disadvantages is given in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Comparison of Factors Modeled
Software reliability models specify the general form of dependency of the failure
process on the principal factors that affect it in order to predict or estimate software
reliability [Lyu 96]. Such factors are involved in fault introduction, fault removal, and
operational environment. In the software life cycle, fault introduction may happen in
requirement analysis phase, specification development phase, design phase, or
implementation phase. In addition, fault introduction may happen due to problem
complexity. Fault removal happens in test phase. Operational environment refers to
proper/improper usage of software or the consistency of software operational profile.
Since no standard is available, different software reliability models model various
factors [Fenton et al. 99]. Factors modeled by a software reliability model detennine its







prediction and estimation. The measurement type is very important to practitioners.
Factors modeled by six software reliability models are compared in Table II.
Table II. Factors Modeled by Six Software Reliability Models
(JM -- Jelinski-Moranda, GO - Geol-Okumoto, LV - Littlewood-Verral)
Problem Software Software Software Operational
complexity developers solution testers profile
Musa's Execution Competence




TheJM LOC, Competence Consistency
Model failure rate of testers
The GO Number of Competence
NHPP faults, times of testers
Model software fail
I
Shoo- Number of Competence





The LV Difficulty of Programmers' Time Effort of Consistency
Model task competence between testers
failures
The Complexity Experience Estimation Experience Consistency
BBN of problem and effort of oflatent and effort of








Table II showed that Musa's models, the Jelinski-Moranda model, the Geol-Okumoto
NHPP model, and Shooman's model model two kinds of factors: 1) software failure data
obtained in test and operation phases, and 2) the competence of software testers. From
software reliability measurement point of view, these models mainly focus on software
reliability estimation. The Littlewood-Verral model and the BBN model model factors in
each phase of software life cycle when failure data mayor may not available. From
software reliability measurement point of view, the Littlewood-VerraJ model and the
BBN model focus on both software reliability prediction and estimation.
3.2.2 Comparison of Availability of CASE Tools
After software reliability model(s) are chosen for specific purposes, one of the many
decisions is the choice of a CASE tool. In this section, the following software reliability
CASE tools were investigated: AT&T Software Reliability Toolkit (AT&T SR Toolkit)
[Lyu 96], Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliability Function for Software
(SMERFS) [Musa et al. 90], Software Reliability Program (SoRel) [Lyu 96], Computer-
Aided Software Reliability Estimation (CASRE) [Lyu 96], Statistical Reliability
Modeling Program (SRMP) [Neufelder 93], Economic Stop Testing Model (ESTM)
[Musa et al. 90], the GOEL tool [Neufelder 93], the HUGIN tool [Hugin 90], and the











Table m. Availability of CASE Tools for the Six Models
(JM - Jelinski-Moranda, GO - Geol-Okumoto, LV - Littlewood-Verral)
Musa's TheJM The GONHPP Shooman's The LV TheBBN
Models Model Model Model Model Model
AT&T SR X
Toolkit
SMERFS X X X X
SoRel X X
CASRE X I X X X X





For each CASE tool in Table Ill, the supplier of the tool, original release time,
hardware requirement, operating systems requirement, memory size requirement, user











Table TV. Comparison of Software Reliability CASE Tools
Supplier Original Hard- Operating Size User Current
release ware system interface pnce
AT&T AT&T 1991 Any UNIX, 120 Command $60
SR Bell platform MS/DOS K -driven
Toolkit Lab.
SME- NSWC 1983 DEC DEC 256 Menu- $59.95
RFS VAX, VMS, K driven
fBMPC MS-DOS
3.0
SoRel LAAS 1991 Macinto Macintosh 200 Command Free
sh II K or Menu-
driven
CASRE NASA 1995 IBM PC MS-DOS 8MB Menu- $136
5.0 driven
SRMP RSC 1988 IBM PC MS-DOS 500 Command $5000
Ltd. 3.0 K -driven
ESTM Bellcore 1987 Sun, HP, UNIX Not Integrated Call
Dec Avai system Bellcore
Worksta lable
-tion
GEOL DACS 1987 IBM PC MS-DOS 256 Menu- $50
2.11 driven
HUGIN HUGIN 1990 lliM PC Windows 10 GUI $3000-
Expert 95 or MB $25000
higher
Norsys Norsys 1995 IBM PC Windows 12 GUT $1000-








3.2.3 Comparison of Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages and disadvantages of six models are compared in Table V.
Table V. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Six Models
(JM - Jelinski-Maranda, GO - Geol-Okumoto, LV - Littlewood-Verral)
Advantages Disadvantages
Musa's Simple and easy to understand; clear Limited application scope; some
Models physical interpretation of assumptions are too simple; some
parameters; low cost to implement; causal factors are not modeled;
several CASE tools are available cannot handle uncertainty
TheJM Simple and easy to understand; Limited application scope; some
Model sound theoretical foundation; low assumptions are too simple; some
cost to implement; several CASE causal factors are not modeled;
tools are available cannot handle uncertainty
The GO Simple and easy to understand; low Limited application scope; some
NHPP cost to implement; many CASE assumptions are too simple; some
Model tools are available causal factors are not modeled;
cannot handle uncertainty
Shoo- Simple and easy to understand; low Limited application scope; some
man's cost to implement assumptions are too simple; some
Model causal factors arc not modeled;
cannot handle uncertainty; few
CASE tools are available
The LV Wide application scope; models Complex model form; <.lose not
Model most causal factors; practical give a clear solution to handle
assumptions; considers uncertainty; uncertainty; difficult to implement
several CASE tools arc available
._.._-
The BBN Wide application scope; models Complex model form; difficult to
Model most causal factors; practical implement; few CASE tools are





AN ANALYSIS OF THE BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS MODEL
BY APPLYING IT TO ScqWizard
A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) enables users to model and reason about
uncertainty. It has the advantage of combining an intuitive visual representation (a
directed acyclic graph or DAG) with a sound mathematical basis (probability theory such
as conditional probability and Bayes' theorem) [Pearl 97].
Conditional probability is defined as follows.
peA IB) = peA, B) / PCB)
where peA I B) is the probability that event A happens under the condition that event B is
known, peA, B) is the probability that events A and B happen at the same time, and P(B)
is the probability that event B happens.
Bayes' theorem is given as follows.
peA IB) = PCB IA) x peA) / PCB)
where P(A i B) is called posterior belief of event A given event B, peA) and PCB) are
called prior belief of event A and probability of event B, respectively, and PCB I A) is
called the likelihood that event B will occur if event A is true.
The importance of Bayes' theorem is that it connects two different probabilities peA I









and B is uncertain. Bayes' theorem propagates the effects of evidence through a network
of variables in all directions [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 88]. This propagation ability
with other features makes BBN a powerful tool in diagnostic and predictive analysis
[Cowell et a1. 99].
In this chapter, the BBN software reliability model was used to predict the reliability
of the SeqWizard software. The SERENE 1.0 Demo tool [SERENE 90] was used for
BBN construction and probability computation.
This chapter is organized as follows. A brief introduction to SeqWizard is provided in
Section 4.1. The analysis of the reliability BBN model for SeqWizard is given in Section
4.2. A discussion of this analysis is given in Section 4.3.
4.1 Introduction to SeqWizard
SeqWizard is a software system developed by the author in the OSU Bioinforrnatics
Lab to automatically process large-scale DNA and protein data.
SeqWizard software contains three major components: SeqProcessor, SeqAnalyzer,
and SeqDatabase. Seq Processor processes DNA or protei n sequence data. SeqAnalyzer
analyzes the similarity of two or more DNA or protein sequences. SeqDatabase generates
relational databases for users. Users can communicate with the SeqWizard software
system from web based graphical user interfaces.
SeqWizard provides following key functionality: 1) searching and browsing from
within the working group or from the outside world; 2) processing large-scale DNA or




DNA or protein sequences based on their similarities with the DNA or protein sequences
that have known functions.
4.2 The Analysis of the Reliabllity BBN Model for SeqWizard
This analysis included seven steps: 1) identifying the key entities in SeqWlzard, 2)
determining the key attributes of the entities relating to reliability, 3) grouping together
related attributes, 4) determining appropriate idioms for each group of attributes, 5)
defining the conditional probability table for each node in each idiom, 6) building the
complete reliability BBN for SeqWizard, and 7) predicting the reliability of SeqWizard.
The rest of this section is organized according to these steps. In Section 4.2.1,
identification of the key entities in SeqWizard is provided. In Section 4.2.2,
determination of the key attributes relating to reliability is given. In Section 4.2.3, related
attributes are group~d together in order to choose a proper idiom. In Section 4.2.4, an
appropriate idiom is detemlined for each group of attributes. Ln Section 4.2.5, the
conditional probability table for each node in each idiom is defined. In Section 4.2.6, all
the idioms arc joined together to build a complete reliability BBN for SeqWizard. Finally
in Section 4.2.7, the reliability of Scq Wizard is predicted.
4.2.1 Identifying Key Entities in SeqWizard
Entities are things or events of interest. Tn SeqWizard, there are three types of entities:
resource cntities, process entities, and product entities. Resource entities include software
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designers, programmers, and testers. Process entities include the problem identification,
requirement analysis, specification development, design process, coding process, and
testing process of SeqWizard. Here we mainly focus on design process, coding process,
and testing process. Product entity is the SeqWizard software. The SeqWizard software
consists of the design generated, the code produced, the programmer's guide, the user's
manual, and the test report.
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Figure 2. Relationships Among Entities(o: resource;D : process; 0 : product)
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4.2.2 Detennining Key Attributes Relating to Reliability
Attributes are properties of entities. In SeqWizard, the key entities were identified in
Section 4.2.1. In this section, the key attributes of each entity relating to reliability are
detennined and listed in Table VI.
Table VI. Key Attributes in SeqWizard Relating to Reliability
Entity Entity Key attributes Description of key attributes in
type relating to SeqWizard
reliabi lity
Resource Designers Experience About five years of design
expenence
Effort 30% of the total development time*
Programmers Experience 1-2 years of programming
experIence
Effort 50% of the total development time
Testers Experience 1-3 years of testing experience
Effort 20% of the total development time
Process Design Design quality
Coding Coding accuracy
Testing Testing accuracy
Product SeqWizard Reliability Attribute to be predicted
Number of latent 60 crucial faults were found in
faults per KLOC** SeqWizard during testing
Operational profile Changed clearly but not dramatically
Problem 25 KLOC* * in SeqWizard
complexity
*Total development time - time includes design, coding, and testing
**KLOC - thousand lines of code
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For resource entities in Table VI, Designers' Experience is the ability to select design
methods, CASE tools, and design strategies. Design Effort is the time spent on design.
Designers' Experience and Effort directly influence design quality. Programmers'
Experience is the ability to program defensively and the ability to improve code
testability. Programmers' Effort is the time spent on coding. Programmers' Experience
and Effort directly influence coding accuracy. Testers' Experience is the ability to make
test plan, to select test strategies, and to choose test cases. Testers' Effort is the time spent
on testing. Testers' Experience and Effort directly influence testing accuracy.
For process entities in Table VI, Design quality is the completeness and accuracy of
mapping a real world problem to a software design. Software faults are actually design
faults [Lyu 96]. Design faults are usually hard to visualize, detect, and correct. Coding
accuracy is the correctness of mapping a software design to a software solution. Testing
accuracy indicates number of crucial faults found in software. Design quality, coding
accuracy, and testing accuracy are directly related to number of latent faults in software.
For product entity in Table vr, Reliability is the attribute to be predicted for
SeqWizard. Reliability is defined as the probability of failure-free operations. Number of
latent faults per KLOC is the direct source of software failure. Operational profile is a set
of operations and the frequency of each operation specified for software. During software
operation, if the operational profile is changed, software reliability will change. Problem
complexity is an attribute that influence design quality and testing accuracy. The more
complex the problem is, the harder it is for software designers to catch all its features.




4.2.3 Grouping Together Related Attributes
The key attributes listed m Table VI are grouped together III Table VII with
rationales.
Table VII. Grouping Related Attributes
Group Attributes in group Rationale for grouping
1 Reliability The fewer the number of latent faults are and
#latent faults per KLOC the more consistent the operational profile is,
Operational profile the higher will the reliability be.
2 #latent faults per KLOC The #latent faults per KLOe equals #faults
#faults introduced per KLOC introduced per KLOC minus #faults found
#faults found per KLOC and fixed per KLOC.
3 #faults found per KLOC The more #faults introduced in software and
#faults introduced per KLOC the higher the testing accuracy, the more
Testing accuracy likely it is to find faults in software.
4 #faults introduced per KLOC The higher the design quality, the fewer
Design quality design faults are introduced. The higher the
Coding accuracy coding accuracy, the fewer coding bugs.
5 Design quality The more experience designers have and the
Design experience more effort spent, the higher the design
Design effort quality. The more complex the problem, the
Problem complexity harder for designers to capture all its features.
6 Coding accuracy The more experience programmers have and
Coding experience the more effort spent on coding, the fewer
Coding effort bugs are introduced into the code.
7 Testing accuracy The more experience testers have and the
Testing experience more effort spent, the more likely to find
Testing effort crucial bugs. The more complex the problem




In Table VII, related attributes are grouped together in order to detennine an
appropriate idiom for each group in the next section. Each attribute listed in Table VII
would correspond to a node in the BBN. Some attributes are grouped into several groups
because they play various roles in different group. Another reason was that different
idioms can be joined together by these common attributes.
4.2.4 Detennining Idioms
Different attributes in SeqWizard were grouped together in Section 4.2.3. In this
section, an appropriate idiom is detennined for each group of attributes. An introduction
to idioms and how to choose appropriate idioms is given in Section 4.2.4.1.
Dctennination of an appropriate idiom for each group of attributes is given in Section
4.2.4.2.
4.2.4.1. What are Idioms and How to Choose Appropriate Idioms?
Idioms are generally applicable building blocks for constructing BBNs [Neil et al.
99]. Idioms specify the relationships among nodes. The main purpose of using idioms is
that idioms act as a library of patterns for BBN development. Using idioms emphasizes
reuse. Five categories of idioms had been identified based on generic uncertain reasoning
[Neil et a1. 99]. These five categories of idioms are described below.
• The Definition/Synthesis Idiom. This idiom models the synthesis or combination
of many nodes into one node for the purpose of organizing the BBN. It also
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models the deterministic or uncertain definition between variables. This idiom
emphasizes definitional reasoning such as "what something is".
• The Cause-Consequence Idiom. This idiom models the uncertainty of an
uncertain causal process with observable consequences. This idiom emphasizes
production and transformation of something.
• The Measurement Idiom. This idiom models the uncertainty about the accuracy
of a measurement instrument. This idiom emphasizes reasoning based on
observations.
• The Induction Idiom. This idiom models the uncertainty related to inductive
reasoning based on population of similar or exchangeable members. This idiom
emphasizes statistical and analogical reasoning using historical data.
• The Reconciliation Idiom. This idiom models the reconciliation of results from
competing measurement or prediction systems.






















Figure 3. Choosing the Right Idiom [Neil et al. 99]
4.2.4.2 Determining an Appropriate Idiom for Each Group of Attributes
In this section, an appropriate idiom is determined for each group of attributes In
Table VII.
For Group 1, the Measurement idiom was determined because software "Reliability"
is measured (estimated or predicted) through "#Iatent fault per KLOC" in software and
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the consistency of software "Operational profile". The instantiation of this idiom, called
reliability idiom, is given in Figure 4.
Reliability
Figure 4. The Reliability Idiom
For Group 2, the Definition/Synthesis idiom was detennined because "#latent faults
per KLOC" is equal to "#faults introduced per KLOC" minus "#faults found per KLOC".





Figure 5. The Latent Faults Idiom
For Group 3, the Measurement idiom was detennined SInce "#faults found per
KLOC" is measured through "#faults introduced per KLOC" during software
development and "Testing accuracy" during software testing process. The instantiation of





Figure 6. The Faults Found Idiom
For Group 4, the Measurement idiom was determined because "#faults introduced per
KLOC" is measured through "Design quality" and "Coding accuracy" during software
development. The higher the design quality is and the more accurate the coding process
is, the less number of faults are introduced in software. The instantiation of this idiom,
called faults introduced idiom, is given in Figure 7.
~.
Design quality Coding accuracy
Figure 7. The Faults Introduced Idiom
For Group 5, the Definition/Synthesis idiom was detennined since "Design quality" is
defined by "Design experience", "Design effort", and "Problem complexity". The




Figure 8. The Design Quality Idiom
For Group 6, the Definition/Synthesis idiom was detennined because "Coding
accuracy" is defined by "Coding experience" and "Coding effort". The instantiation of
this idiom, called coding accuracy idiom, is given in Figure 9.
Figure 9. The Coding Accuracy Idiom
For Group 7, the Definition/Synthesis idiom was detennined smce "Testing
accuracy" is defined by "Testing experience", "Testing effort", and "Problem




Figure 10. The Testing Accuracy Idiom
4.2.5 Defining Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs)
Seven idioms were determined in Section 4.2.4. A conditional probability table (CPT)
for each node of the seven idioms is defined in this section. The SERENE 1.0 Demo tool
was used to obtain all the CPTs. When defining a CPT, if a node had no parents, its
probability is unconditional. The CPT for this node was a uniform distribution of
probabilities over all the states of this node if the probabi lities were not specified
otherwise. That is, each state took a probability of lIn, where n is the number of states of
the node. If a node had parents, its probability was conditional probability.
The SERENE 1.0 Demo tool provides two options for conditional probability
specification: one is "Manually Specified Distributions", and the other is "Function
Expressions". The option "Manually Specified Distributions" means that users need to
assign each probability in the CPT manually based on historical data or expert
knowledge. The option "Function Expressions" means that users need to supply an
expression to indicate the relationship among the parent node(s) and the child node first,
then the tool calculates the probabilities and defines the CPT for the child node based on
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the given expression and its parents' CPTs. Choosing an expression is based on historical
data or expert knowledge. The expressions available in the SERENE 1.0 Demo tool
include: constant values, arithmetic ftmctions, Boolean functions, discrete distribution
functions, and continuous distribution functions. The algorithms for calculating
probabilities and defining CPT were given by Cowell et al. [Cowell et al. 99].
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 4.2.5.1, the CPTs for all
nodes of the reliability idiom are defined. In Section 4.2.5.2, the CPTs for all nodes of the
latent faults idiom are defined. In Section 4.2.5.3, the CPTs for all nodes of the faults
found idiom are defined. In Section 4.2.5.4, the CPTs for all nodes of the faults
introduced idiom are defined. In Section 4.2.5.5, the ePTs for all nodes of the design
quality idiom are defined. In Section 4.2.5.6, the CPTs for all nodes of the coding
accuracy idiom are defined. In Section 4.2.5.7, the CPTs for all nodes of the testing
accuracy idiom are defined.
4.2.5.1 CPTs for the Reliability Idiom
In the reliability idiom (Figure 4), there are three nodes, "#Iatent faults per KLOC",
"Operational profile", and "Reliability".
The node "#latent faults per KLOC" was defined to have 1°discrete states: 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. The states represented software defect density (#defects/KLOC) as
published [Neil and Fenton 96]. The node "#latent faults per KLOC" had no parents in
the reliability idiom. Its CPT was uniform probability distribution. Each state took a
probability of 0.1 as shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. The CPT for "#latent faults per KLOC" in the Reliability Idiom
In order to be simple, five states were defined for the node "Operational profile".
These five states were five continuous intervals: [1,2], [2,3], [3,4], [4,5], and [5,inf]. Here
"inf' represents the last value in the last interval to foHow the convention of the SERENE
1.0 Demo tool. All the "inf' in this thesis has the same meaning. The consistency of
suftware operational profile was indicated by the changes of software operations. Interval
[1,2] represented slightest changes or highest consistency of software operational profile.
Interval [5,inf] represented most dramatic changes or lowest consistency of software
operational profile. The node "Operational profile" had no parents. Its CPT was uniform
probability distribution, Each state took a probability of 0.2 as given in Figure 12.


















Figure 12. The CPT for "Operational profile"
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The node "Reliability" was defined to have five continuous states: [5,6], [6,7]. [7,8],
[8,9], and [9,inf]. The values in each state represented software reliability - probability of
failure-free operations, from 50% to 100%. The node "Reliability" had two parents:
"#latent faults per KLOC" and "Operational profile". Its probability was the conditional
probability P("Reliability" I "#latent faults per KLOC", "Operational profile"). The CPT
for the node "Reliability" was defined manually, based on the historical data provided in
[Neil and Fenton 96] and the understanding of the relationships among software
reliability, number of latent faults, and software operational profile by people in OSU
Bioinfonnatics lab. This CPT was given in Table VIll.
The particular values specified in the CPT of the node "Reliability" (Table VIII)
reflected our belief that the less the "#latent faults per KLOC" is and the higher the
consistency of software "Operational profile" is, the higher the "Reliability" of software
is. The more the "#latent faults per KLOC" is and the less the consistency of software
"Operational profile" is, the lower the "Reliability" of the software is. But "#latent faults
per KLOC" had more impact on software reliability than the consistency of "Operational
profile".
50
Table VID. The CPT for "Reliabi lity"
#latent faults I Operational profile Reliability
I
[6,7] [7,8] [8,9] [9,inf][S,6]
0 [1,2] 0 0 0 0 1
[2,3] 0 0 0 0 1
[3,4] 0 0 0 0 1
[4,S] 0 0 0 0 1
[S,inf] 0 0 0 0 1
1 [1,2] 0 0 0 0 1
[2,3] 0 0 0 0 I
[3,4] 0 0 0 0 I
[4,5] 0 0 0 0.1 0.9
[S,inf] 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8
2 [1,2] 0 0 0 0 1
[2,3] 0 0 0 0 1
[3,4] 0 0 0 0.1 0.9
[4,S] 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8
[5,infl 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 --_.
3 (l,2] 0 0 0 0 I
[2,3J 0 0 0 0.1 0.9
[3,4] 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8
[4,5] 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
[S,infl 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
4 [1,2] 0 0 0 0.1 0.9
[2,3] 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8
[3,4] 0 0.1 0,1 0.1 0.7
[4,S] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
I r5,infl 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
5 [1,2J 0 0 0,1 0.1 0.8
[2,3] 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
[3,4] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
[4,S] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 O.S
[S,infl 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
6 [1,2] 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0,7
[2,3] 0,1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
[3,4] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
[4,SJ 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
is,inf] 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
7 [1,2] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
[2,3] 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
[3,4] 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
[4,5] 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
is,inll 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0
8 [1,2] 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 O.S
[2,3] 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
[3,4] 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
[4,5] 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0
[5,inf] 0.5 0.3 0.2 0 0
9 [1,2 ] 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
[2,3] 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
[3,4] 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
[4,5] 0.6 0.2 0.2 0 0
f5,inf] 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0
51
4.2.5.2 CPTs for the Latent Faults Idiom
In the latent faults idiom (Figure 5), there are three nodes, "#faults introduced per
KLOC", "#faults found per KLOC", and "#latent faults per KLOC".
All three nodes were defined to have the same states as the node "#Iatent faults per
.KLOC" in Section 4.2.5.1. The CPTs for the nodes "#faults introduced per KLOC" and
"#faults found per KLOC" were both uniform probability distributions. Each state took a
probability of 0.1.
The node "#latent faults per KLOC" had two parents: "#faults introduced per KLOC"
and "#faults found per KLOC". Its probability was the conditional probability P("#Iatent
faults per KLOC" I "#faults introduced per KLOC", "#faults found per KLOC"). The
CPT for the node "#latent faults per KLOC" (Figure 13) was obtained from the SERENE
1.0 Demo tool by supplying the following function.
CI = Max (0, C2 - C3)
where Cl represented "#latent faults per KLOC", C2 represented "#faults introduced per
KLOC", and C3 represented "#faults found per KLOC".

















Figure 13. The CPT for "#latent faults per KLOC" in the Latent Faults Idiom
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In Figure 13, the probability of 0 latent fault was 55%, the probabilities of 1-9 latent
faults decreased from 9% to 1% with 1% interval.
4.2.5.3 CPTs for the Faults Found Idiom
In the faults found idiom (Figure 6), there are three nodes, "#faults introduced per
KLOC", "Testing accuracy" and "#faults found per LOC".
The node "#faults introduced per KLOC" had exactly the same states and CPT as it in
the latent faults idiom in Section 4.2.5.2.
The node "Testing accuracy" was defined to have ten continuous states: [0,1], [1,2],
[2,3], [3,4], [4,5], [5,6], [6,7], [7,8], [8,9], and [9,int]. Interval [0,1] represented the
lowest testing accuracy. Interval [9,int] represented the highest testing accuracy. The
CPT for the node "Testing accuracy" was unifonn probability distribution. Each state
took a probability of 0.1.
The node "#faults found per KLOC" had the same states as it in the latent faults
idiom in Section 4.2.5.2. The node "#faults found per KLOC" had two parents: "#faults
introduced per KLOC" and "Testing accuracy". Its probability was the conditional
probability P("#faults found per KLOC" I "#faults introduced per KLOC", "Testing
accuracy"). The CPT for the node "#faults found per KLOC" (Figure 14) was obtained
from the SERENE 1.0 Demo tool by supplying the following function.
Cl = Binomial (C2, C31l 0)
where C 1 represented "#faults found per KLOC" , C2 represented "#faults introduced per
KLOC", and C3 represented "Testing accuracy". "Testing accuracy"1l 0 is the probability
of finding faults in software. When testing accuracy was very high (in state (9,infJ), the
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value of "Testing accuracy"/1 0, or the probability of finding faults would be close to 1.
When testing accuracy was very low (in state [0,1 D, the value of "Testing accuracy"/l 0,
or the probability of finding faults would be close to O.













Figure 14. The CPT for "#faults found per KLOC"
In Figure 14, the probability of 0 fault found was 29%, the probability of 1 fault
found was 19%, the probability of 2 faults found was 14%, and the probability of 3 faults
found was 11 %. The probabilities of 4-8 faults found decreased from 8.5% to 2.0% with
about 2% interval. The probability of9 faults found was 0.7%.
4.2.5.4 CPTs for the Faults Introduced Idiom
In the faults introduced idiom (Figure 7), there are three nodes, "Design quality",
"Coding accuracy", and "#faults introduced per KLOC".
The nodes "Design quality" and "Coding accuracy" were defined to have five
continuous states: [0,1], [1,2], [2,3], [3,4], and [4,inf]. Interval [0,1] represented very
poor desi gn quality or very low coding accuracy. Interval [4,inf] represented very high
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design quality or very high coding accuracy. The CPTs for the nodes "Design quality"
and "Coding accuracy" were both unifonn probability distributions. Each state took a
probability of 0.2.
The node "#faults introduced per KLOC" had the same states as it in the faults found
idiom in Section 4.2.5.3. The node "#faults introduced per KLOC" had two parents:
"Design quality" and "Coding accuracy". Its probability was the conditional probability
P("#faults introduced per KLOC" I "Design quality", "Coding accuracy"). The CPT for
the node "#faults introduced per KLOC" (Figure 15) was obtained from the SERENE 1.0
Demo tool by supplying the following function.
C1 = 6*(1/C2) + 4*(l/C3)
where Cl represented "#faults introduced per KLOC", C2 represented "Design quality",
and C3 represented "Coding accuracy".
. -;.' MonilOling "faulls introduced
P ("faults introduced)
6.1 03669E -03 I
6.1 75264E -03 I
0.0370972 I




9. 785958E -02 D
0.1474354 0
0.1631312 0
Figure 15. The CPT for "#faults introduced per KLOC"
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In Figure 15, the probability of °or 1 fault introduced was 0.6%, respectively, the
probability of 2 faults introduced was 4%, the probability of 3 faults introduced was 10%,
the probabilities of 4 faults introduced was 15%, the probability of 5 faults introduced
was 17%, the probability of 6 faults introduced was 13%, the probability of 7 faults
introduced was 10%, the probability of 8 faults introduced was 15%, and the probability
of9 faults introduced was 16%.
4.2.5.5 ePIs for the Design Quality Idiom
In the design quality idiom (Figure 8), there are four nodes, "Design experience",
"Design effort", "Problem complexity", and "Design quality".
The nodes "Design experience" and "Design effort" were both defined to have five
continuous states: [0,1], [1,2], [2,3], [3,4], and [4,inf]. For the node "Design experience",
years of design were used to indicate the levels of different design experience. Interval
[0,1] represented the least design experience. Interval [4,int] represented the richest
design experience. For the node "Design effort", the percentage of total software
development time (including design, coding, and testing phases) was used to indicate
di fferent design efforts. Interval [0,1] represented the least design effort. Interval [4,inf]
represented the highest design effort.
The node "Problem complexity" was defined to have five continuous states: [1,21,
[2,3], [3,4], [4,5], and [5,inf]. For "Problem complexity", lines of codes (LOC) in
software were used to indicate different levels of problem complexity. Since LOC cannot
be 0, intervals started from 1. Interval [1,2] represented the most di fficult problem.
Interval [5,inf] represented the easiest problem.
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The CPTs for the nodes "Design experience", "Design effort", and "Problem
complexity" were all uniform probability distributions. Each state took a probability of
0.2.
The node "Design quality" took the same states as it in the faults introduced idiom in
Section 4.2.5.4. The node "Design quality" had three parents: "Design experience",
"Design effort", and "Problem complexity". Its probability was the conditional
probability P("Design Quality" I "Design experience", "Design effort", "Problem
complexity"). The CPT for "Design quality" (Figure 16) was obtained from the SERENE
1.0 Demo tool by supplying the following function.
Cl = 2/4*C2 + l/4*C3 + l/4*C4
where C1 represented "Design quality", C2 represented "Design experience", C3
represented "Design effort", and C4 represented "Problem complexity".
.';. Monitoring desing Quality
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Figure 16. The CPT for "Design quality"
In Figure 16, the probabil ity of design quality at very Jow level (state [0,1]) was 2%,
the probability of design quality at low level (state [1,2]) was 21%, the probability of
design quality at medium level (state [2,3]) was 41 %, the probability of design quality at
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high level (state [3,4]) was 32%, and the probability of design quality at very high level
was 4%.
4.2.5.6 CPTs for the Coding Accuracy Idiom
In the coding accuracy idiom (Figure 9), there are three nodes, "Coding experience",
"Coding effort", and "Coding accuracy".
The nodes "Coding experience" and "Coding effort" were both defined to have five
continuous states: [0,1], [1,2], [2,3], [3,4], and [4,inf]. For the nodes "Coding experience"
and "Coding effort", the interpretation of intervals was the same as for the nodes "Design
experience" and "Design effort" in Section 4.2.5.5. The CPTs for the nodes "Coding
experience" and "Coding effort" were both uniform probability distributions. Each state
took a probability of 0.2.
The node "Coding accuracy" took the same states as it did in the faults introduced
idiom in Section 4.2.5.4. The node "Coding accuracy" had two parents: "Coding
experience" and "Coding effort". Its probability was the conditional probability
P("Coding accuracy" I "Coding experience", "Coding effort"). The CPT for the node
"Coding accuracy" (Figure 17) was obtained from the SERENE 1.0 Demo tool by
supplying the follow function.
Cl = 2/3*C2 + 1I3*C3
where Cl represented "Coding accuracy", C2 represented "Coding experience", and C3
represented "Coding effort".
58
.; Monitoring coding accuracy
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Figure 17. The CPT for "Coding accuracy"
In Figure 17, the probability of coding accuracy at very low level (state [0,1]) was
9%, the probability of coding accuracy at low level (state [1,2]) was 27%, the probability
of coding accuracy at medium level (state [2,3]) was 33%, the probability of coding
accuracy at high level (state [3,4]) was 27%, and the probability of coding accuracy at
very high level was 4%.
4.2.5.7 CPTs for the Testing Accuracy Idiom
In the testing accuracy idiom (Figure 10), there are four nodes, "Testing experience",
"Testing effort", "Problem complexity", and "Testing accuracy".
The nodl;s "Testing experience" and "Testing effort" were both defined to have ten
continuous states: [0,1], [1,2], [2,3], [3,4], [4,5], [5,6], [6,7], [7,8], [8,9], and [9,inf]. For
the node "Testing experience", years of testing were used to indicate the different levels
of testing experience. Interval [0,1] represented the least testing experience. Interval
[9,inf] represented the richest testing experience. For the node "Testing effort", the
percentage of total software development time was used to indicate different testing
effort. Interval [0,1] represented the least testing effort. Interval [9,inf] represented the
highest testing effort. The CPTs for the nodes "Testing experience" and "Testing effort"
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were both uniform probability distributions. Each state took a probability of 0.1. For the
node "Problem complexity", the intervals and the CPT were the same as intervals and
CPT for "Problem complexity" in Section 4.2.5.5.
The node "Testing accuracy" took the same states as in the faults found idiom in
Section 4.2.5.3. The node "Testing accuracy" had three parents: "Testing experience",
"Testing effort", and "Problem complexity". Its probability was the conditional
probability P("Testing accuracy" I "Testing experience", "Testing effort", "Problem
complexity"). The CPT for the node "Testing Accuracy" (Figure 18) was obtained from
the SERENE 1.0 Demo tool by supplying the following function.
Cl = 6/10*C2 + 3110*C3 + 1/10*C4
where C1 represented ''Testing Accuracy", C2 represented "Testing experience", C3
represented "Testing effort", and C4 represented "Problem complexity".
























Figure 18. The CPT for "Testing accuracy"
In Figure 18, the probability of testing accuracy at very low level (states [0,1] and
[1,2]) was 8%, the probability of testing accuracy at low level (states [2,3] [3.4]) was
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28%, the probability oftesting accuracy at medium level (states [4,5] and [5,6]) was 34%,
the probability of testing accuracy at high level (states [6,7] and [7,8]) was 26%, and the
probability of testing accuracy at very high level (states [8,9] and [9,inf]) was 4%.
4.2.6. Building Complete Reliability BBN
In Section 4.2.4, seven idioms were detennined. In Section 4.2.5, the CPTs for each
node of the seven idioms were defined. An idiom with the CPT of each of its nodes
defined is called a BBN module. In different BBN modules, nodes with the same name
and the same states are called common node of these BBN modules. Different BBN
modules can be joined together through common nodes. If no common node exists in two
BBN modules, a virtual common node can be introduced to join the two BBN modules.
In this section, seven BBN modules were joined together by common nodes. The
complete BBN is given in Figure 19.
In Figure 19, the seven BBN modules are joined together by double arrows. Double
arrows connected the common node in two BBN modules and indicated the direction of
joining of each two BBN modules. After the joint of seven BBN modules, the
probabilities in the CPT of each node in the complete BBN would be revised by a process
called compilation. The algorithms for compilation were given by Cowell et al. [Cowell
et a1. 99]. After the compilation, the complete BBN will be ready to make predictions.
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Figure 19. The Complete Reliability BBN for SeqWizard
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4.2.7 Predicting Reliability
The complete reliability BBN for SeqWizard was given in Section 4.2.6. In this
section, the reliability BBN is used to predict the reliability of SeqWizard. A set of
hypothetical data was also entered to the reliability BBN to check its suitability before
predicting the reliability of SeqWizard. Checking the suitability of the reliability BBN is
gIven m Section 4.2.7.1. Predicting the reliability of SeqWizard is given in Section
4.2.7.2.
4.2.7.1 Checking the Suitability ofthe Reliability BBN
In this section, the worst case scenario (Figure 20), the average case scenario (Figure
21), and the best case scenario (Figure 22) are generated to check the suitability of the
reliability BBN. For each case, the hypothetical data were entered to the corresponding
nodes in the reliability BBN, then the probability in each state of the node "Reliability"
was observed after a process called propagation. The algorithms for propagation were
given by Cowell et al. [Cowell et al. 99J.
As defined before, the node "Reliability" had five states: [5,6], [6,7], [7,8], [8,9], and
[9,inf]. These states represented software reliability - probability of failure-free
operations, from 50% to 100%. Informally, these states could be interpreted as "Very
Low". "Low". "Medium", "High", and "Very High" reliability, respectively.
63
P(desi!1l ~rience) P(des9l effutl
1 .; P.l) 1 Jl.l]
0 )1.2) 0 ".2)
0 )2.31 0 r )2. 3)
0 )3.4) 0 13.4)









; Momtuflnq codllltJ 1'11",1
o
testing effort
I I I I
~--~""P (cocilg effat)
1
roblem compie esting experie
; Monitoring deSign expellence
I I I' It· I I· I I I II I
'P(protm~) P(COli1I ~iellcel





; MOnltormg testing eUOI!
; MOnltormg reliability
I • •. 1·'-
; Monitoring operational profile
P(operational prolie) P(reiabiy)
0 I )1. 2] 0.6157269 IT[ij
0 I )2.3] 01921273 ]6.7]
reliabilityl
0 I )3,4) 0.1479724 )1,8]
0 I ]4.5] 3.453035E-02 )8,9J















Figure 20. The Worst Case Scenario of the Reliability BBN for SeqWizard
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Figure 21. The Average Case Scenario of the Reliability BBN for SeqWizard
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Figure 22. The Best Case Scenario of the Reliability BBN for SeqWizard
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The worst case: the problem was very complex, designers had little design experience
and spent little effort on designing, programmers had little coding experience and spent
little effort on coding, testers had little experience and spent little effort on testing, and
the operational profile of software changed dramatically. In this case (Figure 20), there
would be a 1% probability that the software would execute with very high reliability, a
3% probability with high reliability, a 15% probability with medium reliability, a 19%
probability with low reliability, and a 62% probability with very low reliability. That is,
most of the time, about half of the total runs of software would fail.
The average case: the problem complexity, designers' experience and effort,
programmers' experience and effort, testers' experience and effort, and the consistency of
the software's operational profile were all in their medium level. In this case (Figure 21),
there would be an 86% probability that the software would execute with very high
reliability, a 8% probability with high reliability, a 5% probability with medium
reliability, a 0.9% and 0.1 % probability with low and very low reliability, respectively.
The best case: the problem was not complex, designers had very rich design
experience and spent a lot of effort on designing, programmers had very rich coding
experience and spent a lot of effort on coding, testers had very rich experience and spent
a lot of effort on testing, and the operational profile of software was just as expected. In
this case (Figure 22), there would be a 100% probability that software would execute
with very high reliability.
The results of the worst case scenario, the average case scenario, and the best case
scenario were in accordance with the reliability cost function [Lyu 96]. This indicated
that the reliability BBN constructed was suitable for software reliability prediction.
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4.2.7.2 Predicting the Reliability of SeqWizard
The measurements and observations collected during SeqWizard development (Table
vn were entered in the corresponding nodes in the reliability BBN. The propagation
result is given in Figure 23 below.
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Figure 23. Predicted Reliability of SeqWizard
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In Figure 23, there is a 73.3% probability that SeqWizard would execute with very
high reliability, a 10.5% probability with high reliability, a 7.2% probability with medium
reliability, a 4.5 % probability with low or very low reliability. This result is very close to
the reliability report during the beta testing of SeqWizard, The reliability report was
generated by three testing groups: Arizona University, Purdue University, and Oklahoma
State University.
In addition to the reliability of SeqWizard, the number of faults introduced per KLOC
to SeqWizard, the number of faults found per KLOC in SeqWizard, and the number of
latent faults per KLOC remained in SeqWizard were also obtained from the reliability
BBN. The result is given in Figure 24,
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Figure 24, Predicted Faults Introduced, Faults Found, and Latent Faults in SeqWizard
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In Figure 24, in the "Monitoring #faults introduced" window, the probability of 7 or
more faults per KLOC introduced in SeqWizard is more than 76% (26% + 30% + 20%).
In the "Monitoring #faults found" window, the probability of finding 1-3 faults in
SeqWizard is more than 71 % (23%+27%+21 %). In the "Monitoring #latent faults"
window, the probability of 5 or more latent faults per KLOC remained in SeqWizard is
more than 62% (l % + 6% + 14% + 20.5% + 20.5%).
4.3 Discussion
The reliability BBN of SeqWizard was given in Section 4.2. The predicted results of
this reliability BBN in the worst case, the average case, and the best case hypothetical
scenarios were in accordance with the reliability cost function [Lyu 96]. This indicated
that the reliability BBN was suitable for reliability prediction. The predicted reliability of
SeqWizard was consistent with the reliability report (generated by three groups: Arizona
University, Purdue University, and Oklahoma State University) of SeqWizard in its beta
testing stage. This result confirmed the effectiveness ofthe BBN model.
When constructing a BBN, the more states are defined for each node, the more
complex the BBN model is and the higher the precision of the predicted result will he.
T\\'o states, "good" and "poor", were defined for each node of the safety-critical system
BBN [Bouissou et al. 99]. Three states, "High", "Medium", and "Low", were defined for
each node of the software quality BBN [Neil and Fenton 96). In this thesis, five to ten
states were defined for each node of the reliability BBN. These states indicated some
intermediate levels between the two extremes.
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The effectiveness of the BBN model for predictive analysis was confirmed by this
thesis. But constructing a suitable BBN is a complex process. Probably the most difficult
part was defining the conditional probability table (CPT) for each node in the BBN. The
difficulty came from three limitations: 1) no standards available; 2) lack of historical data
(many software systems have been developed and deployed, but few measurements and
observations are available); and 3) uncertain nature of attributes. These limitations are the
major reasons why the BBN model is not widely applied in software engineering [Fenton
and Neil 99]. The other reasons include the fact that the probabilistic explanation of
events is abstract [Cowell et al. 99].
71
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Summary
In this thesis, a survey of six current and popular software reliability models was
provided and one ofthe six models, the BBN model, was analyzed in detail.
For the six software reliability models investigated, the following Issues were
discussed for each model: a brief history, model classification, software development
phase(s) applied, basic assumptions, data requirements, model [ann, and application
scope. The six models were also compared from three aspects: factors modeled,
availability of CASE tools, and advantages and disadvantages. Musa's models, the
Jelinski-Moranda model, the Geol-Okumoto NHPP model, and Shooman's model model
two kinds of factors: 1) software failure data obtained in software test and operation
processes, and 2) competence of software testers. These four models mainly focus on
reliability estimation. The advantages of these four models are their simplicity and low
cost to implement. The disadvantages are: 1) some assumptions are too simple; 2) some
reliability causal factors are not modeled; and 3) they cannot handle uncertainty. The
Littlewood-Verral model and the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model model factors
in each phase of the software life cycle when failure data mayor may not be available.
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These two models focus on reliability prediction and estimation. The advantages of these
two models are: I) they are based on practica' assumptions; 2) they model most reliability
causal factors; and 3) they can handle uncertainty. The disadvantages are their complex
model forms and difficulty in implementation. For all the six models, CASE tools were
also investigated in detail. These survey results can be used by practitioners to help make
a decision when choosing among software reliability models.
The reliability BBN for SeqWizard was constructed through seven steps in order to
analyze it in detail. The suitability of this BBN was checked by a set of hypothetical
scenarios. The predicted reliability of SeqWizard was consistent with the reliabi lity report
of SeqWizard in its beta testing stage. This indicated the suitability of the reliability BBN
constructed in this thesis and the effectiveness of the BBN model. In addition to
reliability, the number of faults introduced to SeqWizard, the number of faults found
during testing, and the number of latent faults remained in SeqWizard were also obtained
from the reliability BBN. These predicted results can be used by decision-makers in
software development. The experience obtained in this analysis can be extended to other
applications of the BBN model. We believe that the BBN model is not just effective for
software reliability prediction and estimation, it is also effective for various decision-
making support in software engineering.
5.2 Future Work
There are more than 40 software reliability models in the open literature. Six of them,
Musa's models, the Jelinski-Moranda model, the Geol-Okumoto NHPP model,
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Shooman's model, the Littlewood-Verral model, and the Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBN) model, were investigated in this thesis. The BBN model has been analyzed in
detail through applying it to predict the reliability of the SeqWizard software. Some other
models need to be investigated and analyzed in detail in order to explore their
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AIAA - American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. The nonprofit AIAA is the
principal society and voice serving the aerospace profession. Its primary purpose
is to advance the arts, sciences, and technology of aeronautics and astronautics
and to foster and promote the professionalism of those engaged in these pursuits.
Bellcore - Bell communications and research.
BBN - Bayesian Belief Networks.
CASE -- Computer-Aided Software Engineering. CASE is the use of computer-based
support in software development process.
CASRE - Computer-Aided Software Reliability Engineering. It is an automated software
reliability tool developed by NASA in 1994.
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) - In a Bayesian Belief Network, each node contains
the states of the random variable it represents and a conditional probability table
(cpt). The cpt of a node contains probabilities of the node being in a specific state
given the states of its parents.
DAG - Directed Acyclic Graph.
DACS Data & Analysis Center for Software.
DNA - Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid. A nucleic acid that carries the genetic information in
the cellular organisms and is capable of self-replication and synthesis of RNA
(Ribose Nucleic Acid). DNA consists of two long chains of nucleotides twisted
into a double helix and joined by hydrogen bonds between the complementary
bases adenine(A) and thiarnine(T) or cytosine(C) and guanine(G). The sequence
of nucleotides determines individual hereditary characteristics. A DNA sequence
can be considered as a string of characters A, T, C, and G.
ESTM - Economic Stop Testing Model.




Failure Intensity Function - This function represents the rate of change of the cumulative
failure.
Failure Rate - The probability that a failure per unit time occurs in the interval, say, [t,
t+~t], given that a failure has not occurred before time 1. That is,
Failure Rate = P( t <= T < t+~t I1>t) / L1t
= P( t <= T < t+L1t ) / (~t x P(T>t»
= (F(t+L1t) - F(t» / (M x R(t»
where F(t) is the probability of failure by time t, and R(t) is the reliability function
defined in Chapter 1lI of this report.
GUI - Graphical User Interface.
Hazard Rate - Defined as the limit of the failure rate as the interval size approaches zero,
that is, L1t~O, z(t) = lim(F(t+L1t) - F(t» / (L1t x R(t»
where F(t) is the probability of failure by time t, and R(t) is the reliability function
defined in Chapter III of this report.
Idiom - The basic building block of the Bayesian Belief Networks developed by Fenton
and Neil based on generic uncertain reasoning.
KLOC - Thousand Lines Of Code.
LAAS - Laboratory of Analysis and Architecture of System.
LOC - Lines Of Code.
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) - The expected time that the next failure will be
observed. Also known as Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF).
MUNIN - MUscle and Nerve Inference Network. A causal probabilistic network
constructed to diagnose muscle and nerve diseases through analysis of
bioelectrical signals from muscle and nerve tissues.
NHPP - NonHomogeneous Poisson Process.
NSWC - Naval Surface Warfare Center.
Operational Profile - A set of operations and the frequency of each operation specified
for software.
RSC Ltd. - Reliability and Statistical Consultants, Ltd.
Software Life Cycle - Software development generally includes eight phases:
requirement establishing, specification analysis, planning, design,
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implementation, integration and system testing, maintenance, and retirement.
These phases are collectively called software life cycle.
Software Reliability - The probability of failure-free software operation for a specified
period of time in a specified environment.
Software Reliability Engineering - The application of statistical techniques to data
collected during system development and operation to specify, predict, estimate,
and assess the reliability of software-based systems.
Software Reliability Model - A software reliability model specifies the general form of
dependency of the failure process on the principal factors that affect it. Such
factors include: fault introduction, fault removal, and the operational environment.
SMERFS - Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliability Functions of Software.
SMERFS is an automated software reliability tool developed by Naval Surface
Warfare Center in 1983.
SRMP - Software Reliability Modeling Programs. SRMP is an automated software
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